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1. Introduction
In recent years, economists and political scientists have applied principal-agent theory to
study the relationship between voters and elected o¢cials. The literature starts from the
idea that there is a moral hazard problem between the elected o¢cial and the electorate:
left to his own devices, the o¢cial will pursue his own interests, rather than those of the
voters. This is modelled formally by supposing that the o¢cial can supply unobserv-
able e¤ort (Ferejohn, 1986; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1989; Banks and Sundaram, 1993,
1998) or has the opportunity to “steal” rent from tax revenue (Barro, 1973; Persson and
Tabellini, 2000). However, this literature modi…es standard principal-agent theory in two
crucial ways. First, unlike employees,1 elected o¢cials cannot typically be o¤ered mone-
tary rewards for their performance on the job: the salaries of political o¢ce are usually
independent of short-term performance. Second, dismissal (losing elections) is costly.
Under these two conditions, o¢cials can only be motivated (to supply additional
e¤ort, to steal less rent) by “career concerns”,2 i.e. the fear of losing elections. The
recent literature in this area has modelled this process formally, starting with the seminal
work of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). This literature now comprises a variety of
models (discussed in more detail in the Conclusion) but with two apparently very robust
conclusions; (i) in (sequential) equilibrium, voters follow a cuto¤ rule, i.e. will only re-
elect the incumbent if his observed performance is above a certain critical level; (ii) the
cuto¤ rule always motivates the o¢ce-holder (to supply more e¤ort, or extract less rent).
This paper argues that conclusion (ii) is in fact not robust. We present a simple
two-period model of the agency problem between the electorate and the voters, drawing
on the work of Holmström (1982, 1999) and Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999), and
show that in sequential equilibrium, elections may demotivate: that is, the incumbent
will supply less e¤ort than without the “discipline” of an election. The intuition is simple.
When the ability and the e¤ort of the o¢ce-holder interact positively, the o¢ce-holder can
learn more about his ability by supplying more e¤ort. We call this the experimentation
motive for supplying e¤ort. However, if he is exposed to the possible future loss of o¢ce,
his motive to experiment will be reduced. This diminution in the experimentation motive
may more than o¤set the increase in e¤ort induced by the desire to signal competence
to the electorate (the career concerns e¤ect). One way of interpreting the diminution is
as short-termism; the incumbent underinvests, anticipating he will lose power (see also
Besley and Coate, 1998, for examples of this type).
1Within a …rm, various incentive mechanisms ranging from promotion and demotion, wage changes,
performance contracts (e.g. stock options), are widely used (see Prendergast, 1999, and Gibbons and
Waldam, 1999, for recent surveys).
2Career concerns refer to the fact that an agent’s current actions (e.g. labour supply, e¤ort on the
job) are in part determined by taking into account the e¤ect that these actions have on the agent’s future
career prospects even though no explicit incentives (e.g. performance contracts) links the two.
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The existence of, and implications of, experimentation in a career-concerns setting is
(as far as we know) a new …nding. This is because the existing literature assumes either
(i) that potential o¢ce-holders are already fully (privately) informed about their ability,
as in Banks and Sundaram (1993, 1998); (ii) an additive technology, where information
has no value (Holmström, 1999); (iii) one period only, in which case information acquired
currently cannot be used in the future (Dewatripont et al., 1999); (iv) there is no noise
in the production function so that incumbents can perfectly observe their ability from
performance at the end of the …rst period of o¢ce (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
Our model is the following.3 The economy is populated by a number of citizens, who
may vary in competence if in political o¢ce. Their performance in o¢ce is described by
a production function that maps competence, e¤ort, and a random shock into a scalar
variable, the “public good”. Following Holmström (1982, 1999), Dewatripont, Jewitt,
and Tirole (1999), we assume that citizens do not know their own competence, but can
only infer it from their performance in o¢ce.4 Initially, we compare two institutions in
this setting. The …rst is appointment, where the o¢ce-holder is randomly selected from
the population, and is in o¢ce for two periods. The second is democracy, which di¤ers
from the appointment in that at the beginning of the second period, there is an election,
contested by the …rst-period incumbent and an opponent, the latter randomly selected
from the population, with the winner holding o¢ce for the second period.
Our …rst …nding is that in this setting, even with appointment, e¤ort may vary over
time, due to experimentation, which occurs when the incumbent deviates from the my-
opically optimal action that just maximises the current payo¤ in order to improve the
information content of his signal about his own ability, namely the output of the public
good.5 We show that experimentation will occur in the …rst period of our two-period
setting if and only if e¤ort and ability interact in the production of the public good, and
that when it occurs, it unambiguously induces the o¢ce-holder to put in more e¤ort than
3The closest model to ours is the career concerns model of Chapter 4.5 of Persson and Tabellini (2000),
which also builds on Holmstrom’s work, and that we saw after the …rst draft of this paper was completed.
We show in Section 7 that (subject to some inessential quali…cations) their model can be considered as a
special case of ours where there is no randomness in the production function. As a consequence, in their
model, the incumbent can perfectly observe his competence at the end of the …rst period of o¢ce, and so
there is no experimentation e¤ect, which is the main topic of this paper. Our reading of their model is
that it is intentionally kept very simple to permit an easy analysis of the way career concerns are a¤ected
by electoral rules.
4This is in contrast to the more usual assumption in the principal-agent literature, which assumes that
agents are privately informed. Empirically, there is support for both assumptions. One proxy for the
self-knowledge of an elected o¢cial is the amount of time spent doing the job. In the US, all presidents
except F.D.Roosevelt have served either one or two terms. On the other hand, there is considerable
variation in o¢ce tenure in the UK, ranging from less than one year for Alec Douglas-Hume to 11 years
for Margaret Thatcher.
5The experimentation literature initially studied the problem of a monopolist facing an unknown
demand curve (Prescott (1972) and Grossman, Kihlstrom, and Mirman (1977) are early contributions).
Mirman, Samuelson, and Urbano (1993) develop a tractable two-period monopolist game and establish
conditions under which experimentation occurs. We make use of their results below. Keller and Rady
(1999) surveys the literature.
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the myopic level.
Our key observation is that when we move from appointment to democracy, the incen-
tive to experiment unambiguously falls, for the reason described above. Of course, in our
model, as in others in the literature, elections also have a positive e¤ect on equilibrium
e¤ort via career concerns e¤ect;6 the better the observable performance while in o¢ce,
the higher the probability of being re-elected and therefore the higher the expected payo¤
in the future.
As we show, it is possible that the loss of the incentive to experiment may more than
o¤set the career concerns e¤ect, so that equilibrium e¤ort may be lower in democracy than
with appointment. More generally, we can say that career concerns and experimentation,
while both inducing the incumbent to increase e¤ort, are substitutes under symmetric in-
complete information: that is, democracy introduces career concerns, but also necessarily
reduces the incentive to experiment.
In Section 5, we show that there is also an important relationship between the “e¢-
ciency” of equilibrium with democracy and the presence of an experimentation motive.
Consider a constrained social planner who only knows the distribution of the competency
variable initially (so he is only as well-informed as the citizens), and has the same powers
as citizens, i.e. can “…re” the incumbent if performance falls below some cuto¤ value.
We say that democracy (with or without endogenous entry of candidates) is constrained
e¢cient7 if a constrained social planner cannot make every citizen better o¤. It turns out
that (subject to a uniqueness condition holding) when technology is additive (so there is
no experimentation motive), the equilibrium with democracy is constrained e¢cient, but
that this need not be the case with an experimentation motive.
A subsidiary objective of this paper is to address two other, related, weaknesses of the
existing literature on the principal-agent relationship between voters and o¢ce-holders,
namely (i) that the o¢ce-holders (the incumbent and challenger) are assumed to be ran-
domly drawn from some population; and (ii) have di¤erent preferences than the voters.8
Our model has already addressed the second problem, by having the incumbent and chal-
lenger randomly selected from the same population as the electorate. In Section 4 of the
paper, we extend our model of democracy to deal with (i).
Speci…cally, we study democracy with endogenous (candidate) entry, where at the
beginning of each of the two periods, any citizen can stand for election, and candidates
6In our model, the career concerns e¤ect can also be thought of as a “tournament” between incumbent
and challenger (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983). Whoever wins o¢ce gets “…rst prize”
; and whoever loses, “second prize”.
7Of course, due to the underlying agency problem, the equilibrium outcome with democracy will never
be …rst-best e¢cient, so that the latter is not a very interesting benchmark.
8In Banks and Sundaram (1993, 1998), the principal (voters) care about the output of the agent, but
the agent’s payo¤ is independent of this output. The same is true of Persson and Tabellini (2000), where
voters care about the output of the public good, but the o¢ce-holder cares only about an exogenous
ego-rent and the rents that he can extract from tax revenue.
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are voted on by plurality rule, with the winner taking o¢ce for one period (becoming
the o¢ce-holder). So, this approach combines the citizen-candidate modelling of selection
of o¢ce-holders (Besley and Coate, 1997) with the principal-agent relationship between
o¢ce-holder and voters.9 It turns out that, given the information structure assumed,
our main results do not change qualitatively. In particular, as the candidate entry stage
cannot reveal any information to voters about their competence in o¢ce, there will still
be experimentation in o¢ce. Candidate entry and voting (for all candidates in the …rst
period, and for the challenger in the second) will be determined by other characteristics
of the candidates.10
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 presents the basic results, and Section 4 extends them to the case of democracy with
endogenous entry. Section 5 is devoted to normative analysis. Section 6 discusses some
extensions. Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses related literature.
2. The Model
2.1. Technology
The economy is populated by a set N of citizens with #N = n ¸ 3 and evolves over two
time periods, t = 0; 1: There is a political o¢ce that can only be occupied by one citizen,
the “o¢ce-holder”. The performance of the o¢ce-holder while in o¢ce is measured by a
scalar variable g 2 < which we call the “public good”.
The ability of an o¢ce-holder i 2 N is measured by µi; and his e¤ort level in period
t is ai;t 2 [0;1): Following Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999), this o¢ce-holder
produces gt units of the public good, where :
gt = ¹(µi + ai;t) + (1 ¡ ¹)µiai;t + "t; t = 0; 1 (2.1)
where ¹ 2 [0; 1]: Also, "0; "1 are independently distributed random shocks. In either
period, the o¢ce-holder has to decide on a level of e¤ort before observing "t:
Note that the general production function (2.1) encompasses two important special
cases. The …rst is where ¹ = 1; in which case the technology is purely additive (as in
Holmström, 1999). The second is where ¹ = 0; in which case the technology is purely
multiplicative (in the sense of Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 1999).
We assume that each µi is a random draw from a distribution that can take two
values: µH > µL > 0 with probabilities ¼0; 1 ¡ ¼0 respectively. This draw takes place at
the beginning of period zero. So, the µi are uncorrelated across citizens. We refer to H;
L as the types of the citizens.
9This is explored in more detail in a companion paper, Le Borgne and Lockwood (2000).
10 Following Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988), Rogo¤ (1990), we allow voters to di¤er in “looks”, i.e. charac-
teristics that voters value but are unrelated to competence in o¢ce and therefore economic issues.
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We assume that " has a continuous distribution with probability density function f ,
cumulative distribution function F , and has full support on <. We assume that f satis…es
the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Condition (MLRC) that f 0(")=f (") is a continuous and
decreasing function.11 We also assume that
A0. For any a > 0; there exists "0; "00; "00 > "0; such that f("
0¡a)
f("0) < 1 <
f ("00¡a)
f ("00) :
It is well-known that a large number of distributions satisfy the MLRC (Milgrom, 1981),
including the Normal, and it is easy to check that if " is Normally distributed, A0 is also
satis…ed.
Our production function, plus the assumption that "t 2 <; of course implies that
g can be negative, and so cannot be literally interpreted as a public good in a public
…nance model. The reason for allowing shocks "t to be negative is that if we constrained
"t to be positive, i.e. by assuming the lower bound of the support of "t to be zero, then
if the incumbent observed gt < ¹µH ; he could be sure his type was low. This problem
of “perfect inference” would complicate the analysis considerably. The simplest way to
model non-negativity for gt is to suppose that the random shock is multiplicative, i.e.
gt = [¹(µi + ai;t) + (1 ¡ ¹)µiai;t] "t (2.2)
and has support [0;1): The qualitative features of the analysis of this paper would be
unchanged if we worked with (2.2).
2.2. Preferences
If i 2 N is an o¢ce-holder in period t; and produces gt, then j 6= i only cares about the
level of performance of the o¢ce-holder, i.e. uj;t = gt: If an agent i 2 N is an o¢ce-holder
in period t; she has payo¤ ui;t = gt+R+ rgt¡ c(ai;t), where gt is the net utility from the
public good, as for j 6= i; R + rgt is an “ego-rent” from being in o¢ce (as in Rogo¤ and
Sibert, 1988), deriving from the prestige in managing public a¤airs, and …nally c(ai;t) is
the cost of e¤ort. If r > 0, the ego-rent interacts positively with the amount of public
good provided.12 Following Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988), we assume for the moment that
r = 0 (the case of r > 0 is discussed in Section 6.1 below). Also, we assume that c(:) is
strictly increasing and strictly convex, and13 c(0) = 0; c0(0) < 1.
11The MLRC says that, for a given competency type, a high e¤ort increases the probability of obtaining
a high visible performance at least as much as it increases the probability of obtaining a low visible
performance variable.
12Of course, r > 0 could also model a public duty/altruistic motive for the o¢ce-holder, capturing
the fact that holders of public o¢ce may feel some obligation towards the citizens they represent, quite
independently from the discipline that elections impose.
13The last condition c0(0) < 1 ensures that myopic e¤ort is positive.
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2.3. Institutions
The agent whose task it is to produce the public good (the o¢ce-holder) is selected in
one of two ways. We allow for a third institution in Section 4.
1. Appointment
At the beginning of period t = 0, the o¢ce-holder is selected by random draw from
the set of citizens, and is in place for both periods.
2. Democracy
At the beginning of period t = 0; an o¢ce-holder (the incumbent) is selected by
random draw from the set of citizens. This o¢ce-holder is in place during period t = 0
but faces an election at the beginning of period 1. At this stage, an opponent is selected by
random draw from the set of remaining citizens. The citizens then vote on the opponent
versus the incumbent, and the winner is the o¢ce-holder in period t = 1.
Our modelling of democracy abstracts from the entry decisions of candidates (dealt
with in Section 4 below) while allowing the electorate to “…re” bad o¢ce-holders. It also
is quite close to the modelling of the electoral process in Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988), and
Rogo¤ (1990).
In all cases, for consistency, we will impose the individual rationality condition that
the o¢ce-holder prefers to be in o¢ce than not.
2.4. Information Structure
Following Holmström (1999), and Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999), we assume that
citizens do not know µ = (µ1; :::; µn), but all know the joint distribution of µ (symmetric
incomplete information). It is also assumed that the action a is only observable by the
incumbent. Because of this, the o¢ce-holder cannot be rewarded on the basis of a: If she
receives a salary, this is modelled as a component of R; the “ego-rent”. It is also assumed
that g is not veri…able, so the o¢ce-holder cannot be rewarded on the basis of g:
2.5. Myopic Choice of E¤ort
Consider the choice of e¤ort by an o¢ce-holder who is in power for one period only, and
believes he is high-ability with probability ¼: This o¢ce-holder solves the problem
vo (¼) = max
a
½
¼[¹(µH + a) + (1 ¡ ¹)µHa]
+ (1 ¡ ¼) [¹(µL + a) + (1 ¡ ¹)µLa] ¡ c (a) +R
¾
(2.3)
The …rst-order condition is
¹+ (1 ¡ ¹)[¼µH + (1 ¡ ¼) µL] ¡ c0 (a) = 0 (2.4)
This solves to give a¤(¼); which we call the myopic optimal action by the o¢ce-holder,
given a belief that he is competent with probability ¼: If ¹ = 1; a¤(¼) ´ a¤, for all ¼.
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Finally, we can de…ne the utility of the non-o¢ce-holding citizen when both the citizen
and the o¢ce-holder believe the o¢ce-holder to be competent with probability ¼;
vc(¼) = ¼[¹(µH+a¤(¼))+(1¡¹)µHa¤(¼)]+(1 ¡ ¼) [¹(µL+a¤(¼))+(1¡¹)µLa¤(¼)] (2.5)
Some useful properties of a¤ and the associated value functions vo; vc are the following.
First, it is clear from the …rst-order condition (2.4) that
@a¤
@¼
=
(1 ¡ ¹)(µH ¡ µL)
c00 (a¤)
(2.6)
So, a¤ is independent of ¼ if the technology is purely additive and strictly increasing in ¼
otherwise.
Second, by direct application of the envelope theorem to (2.3), we have
v0o (¼) = ¹(µH ¡ µL) + (1 ¡ ¹)(µH ¡ µL)a¤(¼) (2.7)
so vo is strictly increasing in ¼: By inspection of (2.6), vc is also strictly increasing in ¼.
Moreover, as R > 0, and by the properties of c; vo(¼) > 0, and by inspection, vc(¼) > 0:
3. Positive Analysis
3.1. Appointment
We solve the appointee’s decision problem with the usual dynamic programming approach.
In the second period, the appointee faces a myopic problem, so chooses a1 = a¤(¼1)
where ¼1 is the appointee’s posterior belief that he is a high-ability type. The individual
rationality condition for the appointee is that vo (¼1) ¸ 0 which is always satis…ed.
Now, note from (2.7) above that as long as the technology has a multiplicative com-
ponent, i.e. ¹ < 1; his second-period payo¤ is strictly convex in ¼1;
v00o (¼1) = (1 ¡ ¹)(µH ¡ µL)@a
¤
@¼1
> 0 (3.1)
This means that information about µ obtained by Bayesian updating is strictly valuable.
Now when updating, the appointee can observe both his own output of the public good
in the …rst period, g0; and his action in the …rst period, a0. So, from Bayes’ rule, the
appointee’s posterior belief that he is a high-type is
¼1(a0; g0) = Pr (µ = µH j a0; g0) = ¼0¼0 + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL(g0; a0)=fH(g0; a0) (3.2)
where
fk(g0; a0) ´ f (g0 ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)µka0 ¡ ¹(µk + a0)) ; k = H;L (3.3)
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Note from (3.2) that changes in actions are informative, i.e. a change in a0 a¤ects the
posterior probability that the o¢ce-holder is competent, given output (@¼1(g0; a0)=@a0 6=
0): So, the two well-known14 conditions for optimal experimentation are satis…ed in our
model, i.e. the appointee has an incentive to deviate from the myopic e¤ort level in the
…rst period.
Now we go to the …rst-period problem for the appointee. Note that for a given value
of a0; g0 is a random variable with distribution function
H(g0; a0) = ¼0F (g0 ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)µHa0 ¡ ¹(µH + a0)) + (3.4)
(1 ¡ ¼0)F ((g0 ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)µLa0 ¡ ¹(µL + a0))
Consequently, ¼1(g0; a0) is also a random variable, conditional on a0; implying an expected
optimized second-period payo¤ of Eg0[vo(¼1(a0; g0))]: So, the problem for the appointee
in the …rst period is
max
a0
½
¼0[¹(µH + a0) + (1 ¡ ¹)µHa0] + (1 ¡ ¼0) [¹(µL + a0) + (1 ¡ ¹)µLa0]¡c (a0) +R+ Eg0[vo(¼1(a0; g0))]
¾
(3.5)
The …rst-order condition can be written
[¹ + (1 ¡ ¹)(¼0µH + (1 ¡ ¼0) µL)] + @Eg0[vo(¼1(a0; g0))]@a0 = c
0 (a0) (3.6)
The …rst term in the square brackets on the left-hand side is the …rst-period (myopic)
gain from a small increase in e¤ort. The second term on the left-hand side is the marginal
experimentation bene…t or cost from changing a0 from its myopic level a¤(¼0). Let the
value of a0 that solves (3.6) be aA0 :
The question is now: what sign is the marginal experimentation term? Following
the proof of Lemma 2 of Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano (1993) it is possible to show
(derivation in Appendix B) that
@Eg0[vo(¼1(a0; g0))]
@a0
= ¼0 (1 ¡ ¹) (µH ¡ µL)
Z +1
¡1
v00o (1 ¡ ¼1) d¼1dg0 fH (g0; a0) dg0 (3.7)
Now, from (3.1), v00o > 0 as long as ¹ < 1; and
d¼1
dg0
=
¼0 (1 ¡ ¼0)
[¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL]2 (fLf
0
H ¡ f 0LfH) > 0 (3.8)
from the MLRC. So, we see that
@Eg0[vo(¼1(a0; g0))]
@a0
> 0 i¤ ¹ < 1
14See, for instance, Proposition 1 of Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano (1993).
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i.e. that the experimentation term is strictly positive i¤ the technology is partly multi-
plicative. So, the following result is immediate from the previous discussion and the strict
concavity of c:
Proposition 1. In the second period, the appointee chooses the myopic level of e¤ort
a¤(¼1), conditional on her posterior belief : In the …rst period, the appointee will choose
to experiment by choosing a higher e¤ort than the myopic one, aA0 > a¤(¼0); unless the
technology is purely additive (¹ = 1); in which case aA0 = a¤(¼0).
3.2. Democracy
This case is more complex, as we have a game of incomplete information, where there
is both experimentation (unless the technology is additive) and a career concerns e¤ect.
We characterise the perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this game, which turn out to be
unique15 except that (possibly) the incumbent may choose multiple actions in period 0.
Suppose …rst that the challenger to the incumbent, j 2 N; is elected. His choice of action
is aj;1 = a¤(¼0); because he has no additional information about his own competence. So,
the expected utility to any member i 6= j of the electorate from the opponent is vc(¼0):
Now, at the time the electorate votes, every citizen has had the chance to observe
g0, …rst-period public good provision. Let ¼1 be the updated belief on the part of the
electorate, having observed g0; that the incumbent is a high-type. Now, when forming the
posterior ¼1, citizens rationally deduce that in the …rst period, the incumbent has taken
equilibrium action a¤0. So, their posterior probability that the incumbent is competent is
¼c1(g0) =
¼0
¼0 + (1 ¡ ¼0) [fL (g0; a¤0) =fH (g0; a¤0)] (3.9)
Note that we superscript ¼c1(g0) to distinguish it from the incumbent’s own posterior,
which is de…ned in (3.2). However, note that in equilibrium, ¼c1(g0) = ¼1(g0; a¤0):
Then the expected utility that citizens can expect from the incumbent is vc(¼c1(g0)): So,
given the tie-breaking rule, all the citizens (apart possibly from the opponent), will vote
for the incumbent when vc(¼c1(g0)) ¸ vc(¼0). As vc is strictly increasing in its argument,
this is equivalent to ¼c1(g0) ¸ ¼0. From (3.8), (3.9), ¼c1(g0) is strictly increasing in g0:
Moreover, from this fact and assumption A0, there exists a unique critical value ~g0 such
that ¼c1(~g0) = ¼0; with ¼1 > ¼0 for g0 > ~g0, and ¼1 < ¼0 for g0 < ~g0. The conclusion
is that all voters (except the incumbent) follow the following cuto¤ rule: vote for the
incumbent i¤ g0 ¸ ~g0, and for the opponent if g0 < ~g0: As there are at least three
voters by assumption, this cuto¤ rule determines the outcome of the election, i.e. how
the incumbent votes is irrelevant.
15Su¢cient conditions for uniqueness are derived below.
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It remains to check that it is individually rational for both the incumbent and opponent
to stand for election, given this cuto¤ rule. The net gain to winning the election for the
incumbent is
Á(¼c1(g0)) = vo(¼
c
1(g0)) ¡ vc(¼0) (3.10)
Now, the individual rationality condition requires that Á(¼c1(g0)) ¸ 0; ¼c1(g0) ¸
¼0: But from (3.10), Á0(¼c1(g0)) = v0o(¼c1(g0)) > 0 from Section 2.5. So, we only need
that Á(¼0) ¸ 0. But by de…nition, Á(¼0) = R ¡ c(a¤(¼0)); So, we will assume:16
A1. R > c(a¤(¼0))
This simply says that the “net” ego-rent from holding o¢ce is positive given prior
¼0: Given A1, a similar argument implies that the opponent also wishes to hold o¢ce.
So, in view of the preceding discussion, we can write the second-period equilibrium
continuation payo¤ of the incumbent conditional on g0; a0 as:
w(g0; a0) =
½
vo(¼1(g0; a0)), if g0 ¸ eg0
vc(¼0), if g0 < eg0 (3.11)
So, the expected second-period continuation payo¤ of the incumbent, conditional on …rst-
period e¤ort only, is
Eg0 [w (¼1 (g0; a0))] = vc(¼0)H (eg0; a0) (3.12)
+
Z +1
~g0
vo(¼1(g0; a0))h (g0; a0) dg0
where h (g0; a0) = ¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL is the density of H from (3.4).
Now consider the choice of …rst-period action for the incumbent, given his continuation
payo¤ (3.12). This must solve:
u0 = max
a0
Eg0
½
¼0[¹(µH + a0) + (1 ¡ ¹)µHa0] + (1 ¡ ¼0) [¹(µL + a0) + (1 ¡ ¹)µLa0]¡c (a0) +R+ Eg0 [w(¼1(a0; g0))]
¾
(3.13)
The …rst-order condition can be written as
¹+ (1 ¡ ¹)(¼0µH + (1 ¡ ¼0) µL) + @Eg0[w(¼1(a0; g0))]@a0 = c
0 (a0) (3.14)
After some manipulation, the third term on the left-hand side, evaluated at a0; is given
by (derivation in Appendix B)
@Eg0 [w(¼1(a0; g0))]
@a0
¯¯
a¤0 = ¼0 (1 ¡ ¹) (µH ¡ µL)
Z +1
~g0
v000
d¼1
dg0
(1 ¡ ¼1) fH (g0; a0) dg0
16The strict inequality in A1 rules out several troublesome borderline cases in the model of Section 4
below with endogenous entry.
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+¼0 (1 ¡ ¼0) (1 ¡ ¹) v00 (¼0) fH (eg0; a0) (3.15)
+ [R¡ c (a¤ (¼0))]
µ
¡@H(~g0; a0)
@a0
¶
where
¡@H(~g0; a0)
@a0
= ¼0 [¹+ (1 ¡ ¹) µH ] fH (~g0; a¤0) + (1 ¡ ¼0) [¹+ (1 ¡ ¹) µL] fL (~g0; a¤0) > 0
(3.16)
The …rst term on the right-hand side represents the “experimentation” e¤ect that we
encountered in the appointment case. However, in this case it is clear by inspection that
this term is unambiguously smaller than in the appointment case. The intuition is that
the democratically elected o¢ce-holder only reaps the bene…ts of experimentation in the
event that she is re-elected, which occurs with probability less than one. The second
term ¼0 (1 ¡ ¼0) (1 ¡ ¹) v00 (¼0) fH (eg0) ; which is positive, is an additional incentive to
experiment.
More importantly, the last term in (3.15) is a new e¤ect which we call the “career
concerns” e¤ect, and is the product of two terms. The …rst, R ¡ c (a¤ (¼0)) is the net
gain, or “prize” to winning the election17 when ¼1 = ¼0: The second term, ¡ @H@a0 ; is the
increased probability of winning the “prize” due to a small increment in e¤ort. So, this
last term in (3.15) represents the marginal extra e¤ort that the incumbent o¢ce-holder
is willing to supply in order to win the election. Note that the last term is always strictly
positive by A1.
Let any level of action that solves (3.14) be denoted aD0 : As the career concerns e¤ect
is always positive, then aD0 > a¤(¼0): Then we can summarise:
Proposition 2. In the second period, the elected o¢cial chooses the myopic level of e¤ort
a¤(¼1), conditional on her posterior belief : In the …rst period, the o¢cial will choose a
higher e¤ort than the myopic one, aD0 > a¤(¼0); even if the technology is purely additive
(¹ = 1).
Because this is an equilibrium action in a game, we cannot be sure that it is unique.
Indeed in their analysis of career concerns in the labour market for bureaucrats, Dewa-
tripont, Jewitt and Tirole showed that in the Normal-quadratic version of the model ("
Normally distributed, c quadratic) if the technology is su¢ciently multiplicative, there are
multiple (two) equilibrium action levels, but if the technology is additive, the equilibrium
action is unique.
17This can be related to the tournament literature (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). There, the motivation
for e¤ort is to gain the …rst prize instead of the second prize. Here, the …rst prize for the incumbent
is taking o¢ce (with payo¤ vo(¼0)) and second prize is losing the election in which case the opponent
wins, giving the incumbent vc(¼0): Of course, vo(¼0) ¡ vc(¼0) = R ¡ c (a¤ (¼0)). Therefore, as in the
tournament literature, a policy maker’s e¤ort depends on the spread between winning and losing prizes.
11
In our model, in the additive case, from (3.15), we get
1 +
£
¼0fH
¡
~g0; aD0
¢
+ (1 ¡ ¼0) fL ¡~g0; aD0 ¢¤ (R ¡ c(a¤)) = c0(aD0 ) (3.17)
where a¤ is the myopic optimal action in period 1 (independent of ¼1): So, as c00 >
0, and c0(0) < 1, a su¢cient condition for uniqueness is that left-hand side of (3.17),
viewed as a function of a0, is decreasing for all a0 · aD0 : But for this, it is su¢cient that
f 0H (~g0; a0) ; f 0L
¡
~g0; aD0
¢ ¸ 0; a0 · aD0 ; or, more explicitly
f 0 (x) ¸ 0; x · ~g0 ¡ µL ¡ aD0 (3.18)
This condition will be useful in what follows. We are also able to show that in the
Normal-quadratic case, if the technology is additive, the equilibrium action is unique [see
Appendix C].
Moreover, simulations reported in Appendix C, show that for a range of parameter
values, the equilibrium action is unique even when technology is almost completely mul-
tiplicative (¹ ' 0): So, when comparing institutions in Section 3.3, we will assume that
aD0 is unique.
3.3. Comparing Institutions
We can now turn to the main topic of the paper, the comparison of e¤ort levels under ap-
pointment and democracy. In the …nal period, conditional on posterior belief about type,
the same (ine¢ciently low) e¤ort level occurs under both institutions. The interesting
comparison is therefore in the …rst period. Here, it is instructive to compare the incentive
to raise the e¤ort level above the myopic optimum in the democratic case and the ap-
pointment case. The di¤erence between this incentive in the democratic and appointment
cases is
¢ = [R ¡ c (a¤ (¼0))]
µ
¡@H(~g0; a0)
@a0
¶
(3.19)
+
·
¼0 (1 ¡ ¼0) (1 ¡ ¹) v00 (¼0) fH (eg0; a¤0)
¡¼0 (1 ¡ ¹) (µH ¡ µL) R ~g0¡1 v000 d¼1dg0 (1 ¡ ¼1) fH (g0; a¤0) dg0
¸
Again assuming uniqueness of aD0 ; by the convexity of c(:), aD0 > aA0 i¤ ¢ > 0:
Now, the …rst term in ¢ is the “career concerns” term, and is positive. The second
term in square brackets is the additional incentive for experimentation in the democratic
case. Although it is not analytically possible to sign it in general, it is clear that when the
technology is (approximately) linear, i.e. ¹ ' 1, the second term is zero, and so ¢ > 0
overall, implying aD0 > aA0 the conventional result that elections motivate. Illustrative
calculations in row 1 of Table 1 show that when the variance of " is high, the career
concerns e¤ect on e¤ort may be large.
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Our main focus of interest is to establish conditions under which elections may de-
motivate. Inspection of (3.19) indicates that this is likely to occur when the net ego-rent
from o¢ce, R¡c(a¤ (¼0)) is close to zero. In this case, there is (approximately) no “career
concerns” e¤ect under democracy, so that as long as there is more incentive to experiment
with appointment, we will have ¢ < 0 and hence aD0 < aA0 : For the Normal-quadratic case,
simulation results reported in column 1 of Table 1 below show that this can easily happen,
and the demotivating e¤ect of elections is larger, the more multiplicative the technology
is. A natural way to measure this is in terms of the increase relative to the myopic level of
e¤ort induced by either arrangement. When ¹ = 0:75; (aD0 ¡ a¤(¼0))=(aA0 ¡ a¤(¼0)) ' 1,
but when ¹ = 0; (aD0 ¡a¤(¼0))=(aA0 ¡a¤(¼0)) ' 5=8: Table 1 also shows that it is possible
that ¢ < 0 when µH ¡ µL is su¢ciently large. In this case, information about µ is valu-
able, so the appointee’s incentive to experiment is strong, and is much diminished by an
electoral constraint.
Table 1: EQUILIBRIUM EFFORT LEVELS aA0 ; aD0 IN THE N-Q CASE
n R ¡ c (a¤ (¼0)) : ' 0 50 100 a¤ (¼0)
¹ :
1:00 1:00; 1:00 1:00; 1:20 1:00; 1:40 1:00
0:75 4:05; 4:03 4:05; 4:81 4:05; 5:58 4:00
0:50 7:69; 7:41 7:69; 8:61 7:69; 9:71 7:00
0:25 12:08; 11:22 12:08; 12:19 12:08; 13:00 10:00
0:00 15:00; 14:25 15:00; 14:69 15:00; 15:07 13:00
µH ¡ µL :
0:5 1:1250; 1:1253 1:1250; 1:35 1:1250; 1:57 1:1250
10 3:51; 3:52 3:51; 4:21 3:51; 4:91 3:50
20 6:34; 6:21 6:34; 7:33 6:34; 8:39 6:00
50 15:05; 14:43 15:05; 14:75 15:05; 15:03 13:5
When ¹ is variable, other parameters are: ¼0 = 0:5; µH = 25; µL = 1; ¾ = 100:
When µH ¡ µL is variable, other parameters are: ¼0 = 0:5; ¹ = 0:5; ¾ = 100:
Next, consider the expected probability (taken with respect to µ1; :::; µn) that the o¢ce-
holder is a high-type, under any institutional arrangement. The expected probability that
the o¢ce-holder in either period is high-type under appointment is ¼0, as is the probability
that the o¢ce-holder is high-type in the …rst period, with democracy. In the second period,
the expected probability that the o¢ce-holder is a high-type is
Pr(µi = µH jg0 ¸ eg0 )(1 ¡H(eg0; a¤0)) + ¼0H(eg0; a¤0) = ¼^1 > ¼0
So, we can summarise the discussion as follows:
Proposition 3. The same (myopic) level of e¤ort is chosen in all cases in the second
period. In the …rst period, aD0 > aA0 ; if the technology is linear (in which case there is
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no motive for experimentation), but it is possible that aD0 < aA0 if the “prize” for o¢ce
R ¡ c(a¤(¼0)) is approximately zero and µH ¡ µL is su¢ciently large.
With appointment, a high-ability type is selected in both periods with expected prob-
ability ¼0 < 1. With democracy, a high-ability type is selected in the …rst period with
probability ¼0 and in the second with probability ¼^1 > ¼0.
This raises the possibility that democracy need not be more “e¢cient” than appoint-
ment, as the former, while undoubtedly raising the average quality of the second-period
o¢ce-holder, may lower e¤ort (relative to appointment). This is investigated further in
Section 5 below.
4. Democracy with Endogenous Entry
Here, we consider the following institution, which (as explained in the introduction) allows
for both candidate entry and voting to be modelled in a complete way without any ad hoc
assumptions. There is an election at the beginning of each of the two time periods. The
…rst stage of an election process is candidate entry. Any citizen can stand for election
in either of the two periods, at a cost of ± > 0: We restrict citizens to pure-strategy
entry decisions.18 The second stage is plurality voting over the set of candidates. That
is, every citizen has one vote which he must cast for one of the candidates, (we rule out
abstentions), and the candidate with the most votes wins.19 We impose the restriction
that voters vote sincerely, i.e. for their most favored candidate. The justi…cation for this,
and the consequences of relaxing it, are discussed in Section 6.2 below.
In the event of a tie (i.e. two or more candidates with equal numbers of votes) we
adopt the standard tie-breaking rule that every candidate with the most votes is chosen
with equal probability. In the event that nobody stands for election, a default option is
selected by the constitution, which is that no public good is provided.
Finally, it is very convenient both for the statement and proof of our result (but not
for the main idea) to ensure that voters k 6= i; j cannot be indi¤erent between candidates
i; j; even if he believes them to have the same (expected) competence. This is most easily
done by assuming the following lexicographically secondary preference; If o¢ce-holders
i; j both supply amount gt, k strictly prefers20 (gt; j) to (gt; i) i¤ j > i. The purpose of
introducing these “looks” preferences is to break ties in preferences over candidates that
18Existence of equilibrium in this model is not a problem, and so we do not need to consider the
extension to mixed strategies.
19Given the lexicographic preferences assumed (see below)) a voter is never indi¤erent between two or
more candidates.
20This index could refer to any visible variable that belongs to a citizen but is unrelated to her economic
performance. For instance, her “look” as in Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988) and Rogo¤ (1990). That beauty is
an important determinant of a person’s performance in the labour market is shown in Hamermesh and
Biddle (1994).
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lead to multiple voting equilibria.
Again, here we are interested in locating the PBE of this model. Here, as entry is
endogenous, voters’ o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs about the types of citizens who do
not enter in equilibrium are important. We will assume that at all information sets where
k has entered, all j 6= k believe that k is high-ability with probability ¼0, except where k
is the incumbent (i.e. was elected in the previous period). Given that every citizen who
is not the incumbent believes himself to be high-ability with probability ¼0; these seem
the only reasonable o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs.
Next, let aDEN0 be the solution to (3.14) above, but whereR is replaced byR¡±: Again,
we will assume aDEN0 is unique, which as argued above, is a weak restriction in the Normal-
quadratic case. The interpretation of aDEN0 is that it is the …rst-period e¤ort chosen by an
incumbent with endogenous entry. Then it is clear that aDEN0 < aD0 , as in the endogenous
entry case, the “prize” for winning the election is reduced by the amount of the entry
cost.
To achieve a characterization of the PBE of this model, we need the following assump-
tion, which ensures that candidate entry costs are low enough so that some agent will
stand for election, and high enough to deter all agents from standing for election:
A2. 1nvo (¼0) < ± < vo (¼0)
We then have the following result:
Proposition 4. Assume A0-A2. Then, there is a unique PBE with the following struc-
ture. In period 0, only i = n stands for election and is elected. He chooses action aDEN0 .
In period 1, if g0 ¸ eg0, only i = n stands for election and is elected. He chooses action
a¤(¼1(g0; a¤0)). If g0 < eg0, only i = n ¡ 1 stands for election and is elected. He chooses
action is a¤(¼0):
The intuition for the entry decisions in equilibrium is that given that citizens do not
know their own types, no citizen runs for election on the basis of her superior ability in the
…rst period. Only the citizen with the best “look” stands for election and is elected: non-
economic variables decide which citizen becomes candidate and o¢ce-holder in the …rst
period. In the second period, the incumbent is re-elected if his track record is su¢ciently
good, and anticipating this, he stands. On the other hand, if his track record is weak,
he does not bother to stand (rationally anticipating defeat if he does), thus allowing the
remaining citizen with the best “look” to stand and win.
Note, however, that once in o¢ce in the …rst period, the incumbent’s choice of e¤ort
is exactly the same (modulo the fact that ± reduces the ego-rent) as in the baseline case
of democracy. So, our results are robust to the introduction of endogenous candidate
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entry.21
5. Normative Analysis
In this section, we address the question of whether the equilibrium outcome under our
main institution of interest, democracy, is Pareto-e¢cient relative to some benchmark.
So, we are following Wittman (1989), Besley and Coate (1998), in studying e¢ciency
of democracy in the Pareto sense, rather than relative to some arbitrary social welfare
function (e.g. Benthamite) for a social planner.22
An outcome here is de…ned as (i) a choice of o¢ce-holder in each period; (ii) a level of
action by the o¢ce-holder in each period, conditional on his information about his type.
With democracy, outcomes (i) and (ii) are described by Propositions 1, 2, and 4.
One widely used benchmark is what could be achieved by a social planner with com-
plete information (i.e. knowing µ1; :::; µn, and able to choose action levels) who can choose
the identity and e¤ort of the o¢ce-holder, and a full set of economic instruments (i:e:
can make unrestricted transfers of some numéraire good between citizens).
Say that democracy with endogenous entry is unconstrained e¢cient if the social
planner of this type (the unconstrained social planner) cannot choose a feasible outcome
that makes every citizen better o¤. Assume for convenience that citizen utilities are linear
in the numéraire good. As the social planner can make unrestricted transfers between
agents, democracy (with or without endogenous entry) is unconstrained e¢cient if and
only if it selects the same conditional actions in each period, and the same choice of
o¢ce-holder, as does the social planner.
It is then clear that democracy cannot be unconstrained e¢cient. First, clearly, the
social planner will always select a high-type o¢ce-holder; if the o¢ce holder i is a low
type, all voters, except i are better o¤ if a high-type is made o¢ce holder, and the gainers
can clearly compensate i. Also, as there are n citizens, each of whom gets utility g from
a level of the public good g, the social planner will choose a to maximize the expected
value of ng minus c(a); conditional on a high-type being in o¢ce, i.e. it solves
n(¹+ (1 ¡ ¹)µH) = c0(a) (5.1)
Let the solution to (5.1) be a¤¤. Comparing these outcomes to the equilibrium ones in
Propositions 1, 2, and 4, it is clear that equilibrium outcomes with democracy are never
unconstrained e¢cient.
21As shown in a companion paper (Le Borgne and Lockwood, 2000) this need not be the case under
an asymmetric information structure - as is commonly assumed in the literature.
22All citizens have identical preferences over outcomes in any period (a choice of o¢ce-holder and an
e¤ort level for this o¢ce-holder). However, as the “good” of o¢ce is indivisible, any outcome must be
horizontally inequitable, and so the social planner faces the problem of preference aggregation.
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The weakness of the unconstrained e¢ciency benchmark is of course that the social
planner is given superior information and more economic instruments than the o¢ce-
holder. Consider now a constrained social planner who has the same information as the
citizens (i.e. only knows the distribution of µ initially), and has the same powers as
citizens, i.e. can “…re” the incumbent if performance falls below some cuto¤ value (i.e.
no ability to redistribute the numéraire good). Say that democracy (with or without
endogenous entry) is constrained e¢cient if this social planner cannot choose a feasible
outcome that makes every citizen better o¤. Constrained e¢ciency is a much weaker test
for any institution.
It is easy to see that the only feasible actions for the constrained social planner are; (i)
random selection of an o¢ce-holder in the …rst period; (ii) replacement of the initial o¢ce-
holder by another citizen selected at random if the only publicly observable indicator of the
incumbent’s performance, g0, falls into some “unacceptable” set U . From the assumption
of the MLRC, the social planner can do no better than to set U = fg0 jg0 < g¤0 g, i.e.
follow a cuto¤ rule. Obviously, if g¤ = ¡1; this is simply appointment, and if g¤0 = eg0,
democracy.
Nevertheless, in the presence of an experimentation motive (¹ < 1); democracy may
not even be constrained e¢cient. Indeed, we can state:
Proposition 5. Assume A1, A2. Democracy (with or without endogenous entry) is
constrained e¢cient if the technology is additive (¹ = 1) and in addition (i) the su¢cient
condition (3:18) for uniqueness of aD0 holds; (ii) R > c(a¤) + ¼0(µH ¡ µL). However,
with (partly) multiplicative technology (¹ < 1), there are parameter values for which
“appointment ”, i.e. g¤0 = ¡1, may Pareto-dominate democracy, in which case democracy
is not even constrained e¢cient.
The key idea is that with a linear technology, there is never unanimity about changing
g¤0 from eg0; the initial o¢ce-holder will always prefer g¤0 = ¡1; e¤ectively making him an
appointee, but all citizens who never hold o¢ce always prefer (ex ante) a g¤0 higher than eg0,
in order to motivate the initial o¢ce-holder to supply more e¤ort. This argument breaks
down when the technology becomes multiplicative, as then (due to the experimentation
e¤ect) the initial o¢ce-holder may be motivated23 by lowering the cuto¤ g¤0, as then he
captures more of the gains from experimenting. So then, everybody may gain from a
lowering of g¤0 :
Note …nally that the condition R > c(a¤) + ¼0(µH ¡ µL) is a strengthening of A1; in
the linear case, A1 is of course R > c(a¤):
23This also requires that the career concerns e¤ect will be small, i.e. that the “prize” for winning the
election (R ¡ c(a¤ (¼0))) is approximately zero.
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6. Extensions
6.1. O¢ce-Holder Altruism (r > 0)
The assumptions of the model generate a very strong form of underprovision of e¤ort;
as e¤ort is non-contractible, the o¢ce-holder only has 1=n of the correct incentive to
provide e¤ort. Consequently, (at least for large n); the higher equilibrium e¤ort, the
more e¢cient the e¤ort is. This strong result can be re…ned by the (admittedly, ad hoc)
device of supposing that the position of o¢ce has some psychological impact on the o¢ce-
holder, making him or her more altruistic.24 If r > 0, the positive analysis of the paper is
qualitatively unchanged, except that the total ego-rent from o¢ce is now R+r(n¡1)g; i.e.
the ego-rent depends on performance while in o¢ce.
6.2. Strategic Voting
Our analysis has assumed that voters vote sincerely (i.e. for their most preferred candi-
date) at each election, no matter what the candidate set is. However, it is well-known25
that when there are three or more candidates, voting sincerely might not be the only Nash
equilibrium strategy (see Besley and Coate, 1997; or Dhillon and Lockwood, 2000). For
example, in our model, it is a Nash equilibrium for all voters to vote for the candidate with
the lowest index (i.e. looks characteristic). This is because no single voter can change
the outcome by deviating, and so it is a weak best response to vote this way. However, as
looks are uncorrelated with competence, this would not change the equilibrium outcome
described in Proposition 4 in any economically relevant way.
7. Related Literature and Conclusions
7.1. Related Literature
The papers26 most closely related to this one are Ferejohn (1986), Austen-Smith and
Banks (1989), Banks and Sundaram (1993, 1998), and Persson and Tabellini (2000). In
all these models, there is a moral hazard problem between o¢ce-holder and voters, and
periodic elections unambiguously induce incumbent o¢ce-holders to supply more e¤ort
(or in the case of Persson and Tabellini (2000) extract less rent).
24Holmström and Milgrom (1991) have such a type of assumption in their multitask agency model:
they assume that not all work is unpleasant for an agent so that even without explicit incentives, the
agent will supply e¤ort on some tasks.
25There is also much empirical evidence that it occurs in single-seat elections by plurality rule (Cox,
1997).
26Barro (1973) was the …rst to explicitly model electoral control of politicians. However, in his model,
the actions of o¢ce-holders were always observable, and so if o¢ce-holders are in…nitely lived, they can
always be induced to take e¢cient actions, if discounting is su¢ciently low (by a simple folk theorem
argument).
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In a classic article, Ferejohn (1986) proposed a simple and elegant moral hazard model
of electoral control of o¢ce-holders. In equilibrium, voters follow a cuto¤ rule by voting
for the incumbent only if his observed performance does not fall below a certain level, and
the candidate chooses e¤ort so that performance remains just at the cuto¤. So, o¢ce-
holder e¤ort is higher than it would be without elections (there is electoral control of the
incumbent).
As Ferejohn himself recognized (see p10 of his paper) his analysis relies27 on the
assumption that o¢cial may stay in o¢ce for ever (no term limits). With term limits,
incumbents can never be induced to supply more than their myopic level of e¤ort in the
…nal period, and an “unraveling” argument then shows that incumbents can then never
be induced to supply more than their myopic level of e¤ort in any period of o¢ce.28
More recently, Banks and Sundaram (1998) have shown that with …nite term limits,
there can be electoral control of the incumbent if there is also an adverse selection ingre-
dient to the model, namely, some ability parameter of the potential o¢ce-holder that is
initially unobservable to the electorate. In this case, it is no longer ex post optimal to
“…re” the incumbent in his last term of o¢ce if he has revealed himself to be of high enough
quality. Indeed, under some very weak regularity conditions, the threat of (electoral)29
dismissal induces agents of all types to supply more e¤ort than they would otherwise in
their …rst term of o¢ce30 (Proposition 3.3).
Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 4.5), have a two-period model with both adverse
selection and moral hazard, where, as in this paper, initially the incumbent does not know
his type.31 Given an incumbent with competence µ; the technology for supplying the
public good is
gt = µ(¿ ¡ rt) (7.1)
where gt is output of the public good, ¿ is exogenous tax revenue, and rt are rents
misappropriated from tax revenues. So, incumbents transform tax revenues net of rents
into public goods. Voters care only about the level of public good provision, and the
o¢ce-holder in period t has payo¤ R+ rt, where R is an ego-rent, as in our model.
Although Persson and Tabellini model rents in monetary terms, one (formally very
similar) way of interpreting rent is to assume that it is the degree to which the o¢cial
27With term limits, Ferejohn’s model can only exhibit electoral control in equilibrium if voters can
precommit to a cuto¤ rule, a rather unattractive assumption.
28For a formal statement of this result, see Banks and Sundaram (1998), Proposition 3.5.
29Banks and Sundaram have a general model where the principal can only control the agent by dis-
missing him. This has an electoral interpretation, amongst others.
30See Besley and Case (1995) for an empirical test of the e¤ects of term limits on the behaviour of US
State governors.
31Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997) have a paper where in the …rst period, the incumbent chooses an
observable discrete project, but where the value of the project depends on the incumbent’s ability (initially
unknown to everybody) and a random shock. The paper focuses on the issue of whether undertaking the
project is a good or bad signal to the electorate about the incumbent’s ability.
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“slacks” from the …rst-best level of e¤ort de…ned in (5.1), i.e. r = a¤¤ ¡ a: In that case,
we can write our production function, assuming ¹ = 1; as
gt = µ(a¤¤ ¡ rt) + "t
which is of course formally identical to (7.1) except that we now have a random produc-
tivity shock.
Also, note that the payo¤s to the o¢ce-holder in our model can be written R + gt ¡
c(a¤¤ ¡ rt): So, the payo¤s in Persson and Tabellini correspond to the special case where
c is linear and the incumbent does not care about the public good.32 To conclude, the
Persson and Tabellini career concerns model can be thought of as a “special case” of ours,33
and moreover, one in which the experimentation e¤ect is ruled out by construction.
Of course, the merit of their model is that it is very simple and easily analyzed, and
so it very well-suited to an analysis of the way career concerns are a¤ected by electoral
rules (Persson and Tabellini (2000), chapter 9.1). This would be much more di¢cult with
a model such as ours.
7.2. Conclusions
Under symmetric incomplete information, an important insight from our paper is that
career concerns and experimentation, while both inducing the incumbent to increase e¤ort,
are substitutes: that is, democracy introduces career concerns, but also necessarily reduces
the incentive to experiment leading to short-termism in o¢ce. This substitutability is not
present in other career concerns models because of simplifying assumptions which prevent
experimentation from occurring (e.g. static model or additive technology).
In our electoral model, a corollary of this substitutability is that (conditional on ability)
…rst-period e¤ort may be higher or lower with democracy than with appointment. Our
result is however more general and applies to other labour markets: as long as the agent
has some positive probability of being “…red” by the principal, that the model is dynamic
and the technology the agent uses is at least partly multiplicative in talent and e¤ort then
both career concerns and experimentation will be present. The general message is that
the selection and retention process of an agent are important elements of job design in
agency relationships.
8.
32This last fact creates the modelling problem that in the …nal period, the incumbent will supply no
e¤ort, i.e. extract maximum rent, whatever his type, implying that voters do not care about the types
of the elected o¢cials. Persson and Tabellini deal with this in a relatively ad hoc way by imposing an
upper bound on the amount of rent that can be extracted.
33Mathematically, it is not literally a special case, as in their model, µ is continuously distributed.
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A. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 4. We show that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium described
exists and is unique by backwards induction. First, it is clear that any i 2 N who is
elected at period 1 chooses a¤(¼0) if he was not a …rst-period o¢ce-holder, and chooses
a¤(¼c1(g0)) if he was a …rst-period o¢ce-holder:
Next, consider the behaviour of the voters, given any candidate set C1: The …rst case
is where the incumbent (say i) is not in C1: Then, the voters in N=C1 will vote for their
most preferred candidate in C1: By our assumption about beliefs, voters believe that any
member of C1 is a high-type with probability ¼0: So, they prefer the one with the highest
index, m(C1) = maxi2C1 . Finally, by A1, every candidate will vote for herself.
The second case is where the incumbent (say i) is in C1: Then, all voters know that
i is high-ability with probability ¼c1(g0), and believe that any j 2 C1=fig is high-ability
with probability ¼0. So, if g0 > eg0, all voters in N=C1 will vote for i. Also, i will vote
for herself by A1. The remaining voters, i.e. C=fig will either vote for themselves or i,
as vo(¼0) is greater or less than vc(¼c1(g0)): If g0 < eg0, all voters in N=C1 will vote for
m0(C1) = maxj2C1=fig : Also, i will vote for herself or m0(C1) as vo(¼c1(g0)) is greater or
less than vc(¼0): The remaining voters, i.e. C1=fig will vote for themselves by A1. If
g0 = eg0; all voters in N=C1 will vote for m(C1) = maxj2C1 : The remaining voters, i.e.
C1 will vote for themselves by A1.
Now consider the candidate entry decision in period 1.
Case 1. C1 6= N: If g0 > eg0; and the incumbent i enters the election, she will surely
win, no matter who else stands. So, the incumbent will be the only entrant. Now let
l =
n n if i < n
n¡ 1 if i = n (A1)
If g0 < eg0; if l enters the election, l = m0(C1); so she will surely win, no matter who else
stands (including the incumbent). So, l will be the only entrant. Finally, if g0 = eg0; if
n enters the election, n = m(C1), so she will surely win, no matter who else stands
(including the incumbent). So, n will be the only entrant.
Case 2. C1 = N: In this case, at the voting stage, every candidate votes for himself
and is elected to be o¢ce-holder with probability 1=n. The payo¤ to any agent who is not
the incumbent from entry is thus is 1nvo(¼0) ¡ ±; which is negative by A2. On the other
hand, any i 2 N can guarantee herself a positive payo¤ by not entering. So, this case is
impossible in equilibrium.
So we have demonstrated that given a …rst-period incumbent i; with output g0; in the
second period, the unique equilibrium candidate set is
C1(i; g0) =
( fig; g0 > eg0flg; g0 < eg0fng; g0 = eg0 (A2)
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Now consider the …rst period. Clearly, if i 2 N is elected, she rationally anticipates that
she will stand for election next period (and win) i¤ either (i) i = n; g0 ¸ eg0; or (ii)
i < n; g0 > eg0: In either case, given that " is absolutely continuous, she chooses a0 to
solve problem (3.13) where R is replaced by R¡±: Moving to the voting stage, by previous
arguments, all voters in N=C0 will vote for m(C0) = maxi2C0; and all voters in C0 will
vote for themselves. So, again by previous arguments, C0 = fng: ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. (a) We prove …rst that with additive technology, equilibrium
with democracy is weakly e¢cient. To do this, it is su¢cient to show that there does not
exist a cuto¤ g¤0 6= eg0 where all citizens are better o¤ than at the equilibrium cuto¤.
Let ° be an arbitrary cuto¤. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the social
planner chooses citizen n to be the …rst-period o¢ce holder, and n ¡ 1 to replace him
in the second period if his performance falls below °: Let a0(°) be the o¢ce-holder’s
…rst-period action given the cuto¤. So, a0(°) solves (3.17) with ° replacing eg0: Totally
di¤erentiating (3.17), we get
a00(°) =
A
c00(a0(°)) +A
; (A.1)
where A = [¼0f 0H (°; a0(°)) + (1 ¡ ¼0) f 0L (°; a0(°))] (R ¡ c(a¤))
Also, c00 > 0; and as (3.18) holds we have A ¸ 0; ° · eg0: So, from (A.1) we have
0 · a00(°) < 1; ° · eg0 (A.2)
We can …rst write down expected present value payo¤ of i = n conditional on this cuto¤,
given that the o¢ce-holder optimizes his actions in both periods;
vn(°) = µ + a0(°) +R ¡ c(a0(°)) +
Z 1
°
vc(¼1(a0(°); g0))h(g0; a0(°))dg0 (A.3)
+H(°; a0(°))vc(¼0)
where µ = ¼0µH+(1¡¼0)µL: Note …rst that from (A.3) and the fact that a0(°) maximises
(3.17):
v0n(°) = h(°; a0(°))[vc(¼0) ¡ vo(¼1(a0(°); °))] (A.4)
< h(°; a0(°))[vc(¼0) ¡ vo(0)]
< 0
where the second line follows from the properties of vo; vc given in Section 2.5, and the third
from the assumption that R > c(a¤) + ¼0(µH ¡ µL); which is equivalent to vo(0) > vc(¼0)
when ¹ = 1. So, from (A.4), n prefers the lowest possible ° = ¡1 (i.e. no election).
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So, the social planner cannot make everybody better o¤ by raising ° from eg0: Thus, to
prove that the equilibrium is weakly e¢cient, it su¢ces to prove that some j 6= n most
prefers a cuto¤ at or above eg0: For then, the social planner cannot make everybody better
o¤ by lowering ° from eg0, either. Note that for j < n¡ 1 :
vj(°) = µ + a0(°) +
Z 1
°
vc(¼1(a0(°); g0))h(g0; a0(°))dg0 +H(°; a0(°))vc(¼0) (A.5)
Now di¤erentiating (A.5), we have;
v0j(°) =
@vj
@a0
a00(°) + h(°; a0(°))[vc(¼0) ¡ vo(¼1(a0(°); °))]; j < n¡ 1 (A.6)
Now, note from (3.2) that with a linear technology, ¼1(a0(°); °) ´ ¼1(° ¡ a0(°)); with
¼01(:) > 0 by the MLRC. So, from this fact and the fact from (A.2) that ° ¡ a0(°) is
increasing in °; from (A.6), we have
vo(¼1(a0(°); °)) · vo(¼1(a0(eg0); eg0)); ° · eg0 (A.7)
Also, by previous de…nitions and results:
vc(¼0) = vo(¼1(a0(eg0); eg0)) ¡ (R¡ c(a¤)) (A.8)
< vo(¼1(a0(eg0); eg0))
· vo(¼1(a0(eg0); eg0)); ° · eg0
In the …rst line, we have used the de…nition of eg0 that ¼0 = ¼1(a0(eg0); eg0); and the
de…nitions of vc; vo: In the second, we have used R > c(a¤) from A1 (note with linearity,
the myopic action a¤ does not depend on ¼1): In the third, we have used (A.7). Therefore,
from (A.6), (A.8), we see that
v0j(°) ¸ @vj@a0a
0
0(°); ° · eg0; j < n¡ 1 (A.9)
Finally, it is obvious that @vj=@a0 > 0, as a0 is chosen optimally by the o¢ce-holder, n,
but j 6= n does not bear the cost of the action. So, from this fact, (A.2) and (A.9), we
conclude that v0j(°) ¸ 0; ° · eg0 so j < n¡1 most prefers a cuto¤ at least eg0; as required.
(b) An example with non-additive technology where appointment Pareto-dominates
democracy can be constructed as follows. W.l.o.g., assume that the incumbent is n and
the challenger is n¡ 1: Equilibrium payo¤s under democracy, allowing ¹ 6= 1; are:
vDn = ¹(µ + a
D
0 ) + (1 ¡ ¹)µaD0 +R¡ c(aD0 ) +
Z 1
eg0 [vo(¼1(a
D
0 ; g0))h(a
D
0 ; g0)dg0 +
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H(eg0; a0(eg0))vc(¼0)
vDn¡1 = µ + a0(eg0) + Z 1eg0 vc(¼1(a0(eg0); g0))h(g0; a0(eg0))dg0 +H(eg0; a0(eg0))vo(¼0)
vDj = µ + a0(eg0) + Z 1eg0 vc(¼1(a0(eg0); g0))h(g0; a0(eg0))dg0 +H(eg0; a0(eg0))vo(¼0); j < n¡ 1
Also, under appointment of citizen i; the expected utilities are
vAi = ¹(µ + a
A
0 ) + (1 ¡ ¹)µaA0 +R ¡ c(aA0 ) +
Z 1
¡1
vo(¼1(aA0 ; g0))h(a
A
0 ; g0)dg0
vAj = ¹(µ + a
A
0 ) + (1 ¡ ¹)µaA0 +
Z 1
¡1
vo(¼1(aA0 ; g0))h(a
A
0 ; g0)dg0; j 6= i
The example is the following. First, " is Normal, with mean zero and ¾ = 50, and
c(a) = a2=2, and other parameters are: ¹ = 0:5, ¼0 = 0:55 , R = 39:9; µH = 25;
µL = 1; ± = 1: In this case, equilibrium payo¤s can be calculated using the above
formulae as:
vAi = 156:3; v
A
j = 152:1; j 6= i
vDn = 148:4; v
D
n¡1 = 148:2; v
D
j = 143:6; j 6= n; n¡ 1
So, we see that maxi2N vDi < min vAi , and so we can be sure that appointment Pareto-
dominates democracy with endogenous entry. ¤
B. Derivations
Derivation of (3.7)
(Adapted from the proof of Proposition 2 of Mirman et al., 1993). Before turning to the
derivation of equation (3.7) itself, the following results are useful. First:
d¼1 (g0; a0)
dg0
=
¼0 (1 ¡ ¼0)
[¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL]2
³
fLf
0
H ¡ fHf 0L
´
¸ 0 (B1)
where fH = f (g0 ¡ (1 ¡ ¹) µHa0 ¡ ¹ (µH + a0)) ; and fL = f (g0 ¡ (1 ¡ ¹) µLa0 ¡ ¹ (µL + a0)) :¡
fLf
0
H ¡ fHf 0L
¢ ¸ 0 follows from the MLR property. Second:
d¼1 (g0; a0)
da0
= ¡ [¹+ (1 ¡ ¹) µH ] d¼1dg0 ¡
¼0 (1 ¡ ¼0) (1 ¡ ¹) (µH ¡ µL)
[¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL]2 fHf
0
L (B2)
= ¡ [¹+ (1 ¡ ¹) µL] d¼1dg0 ¡
¼0 (1 ¡ ¼0) (1 ¡ ¹) (µH ¡ µL)
[¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL]2 fLf
0
H (B3)
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We can now evaluate (3.7). Notice that
Eg0vo [¼1 (g0; a0)] =
Z +1
¡1
vo [¼1 (g0; a0)]h (g0; a0) dg0
where h (g0; a0) = ¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL. Thus, denoting dEg0vo [¼1 (g0; a0)] =da0 = ¡; we
have:
¡ =
Z
v
0
o
d¼1
da0
[¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL] dg0¡
Z
vo
·
¼0 (¹+ (1 ¡ ¹) µH) f 0H
+(1 ¡ ¼0) (¹ + (1 ¡ ¹) µH) f 0L
¸
dg0 (B4)
Integrating by parts the second term of (B4) and then rearranging with the …rst term
gives
¡ =
Z
v
0
o
µ
d¼1
da0
+ (¹+ (1 ¡ ¹) µH) d¼1dg0
¶
¼0fHdg0 (B5)
+
Z
v
0
o
µ
d¼1
da0
+ (¹ + (1 ¡ ¹) µL) d¼1dg0
¶
(1 ¡ ¼0) fLdg0
Using (B2) and (B3), expression (B5) becomes
¡ = ¡
Z
v
0
o
¼0 (1 ¡ ¼0) (1 ¡ ¹)
[¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL]2
¡
µH ¡ µL¢ fHf 0L¼0fHdg0 (B6)
¡
Z
v
0
o
¼0 (1 ¡ ¼0) (1 ¡ ¹)
[¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL]2
¡
µH ¡ µL¢ f 0HfL (1 ¡ ¼0) fLdg0
Because ¼1 = ¼0fH/ [¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL] and (1 ¡ ¼1) = (1 ¡ ¼0) fL/ [¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL],
equation (B6) becomes
¡ = ¡ (µH ¡ µL)
½Z
v
0
o¼
2
1 (1 ¡ ¼0) (1 ¡ ¹) f 0Ldg0 +
Z
v
0
o (1 ¡ ¼1)2 ¼0 (1 ¡ ¹) f 0Hdg0
¾
(B7)
Using the fact that (1 ¡ ¼1)2 = (1 ¡ ¼1) ¡ ¼1 (1 ¡ ¼1), we can rewrite (B7) as
¡ = ¡ (µH ¡ µL)
½ R
v0o (1 ¡ ¹)¼1
£
¼1 (1 ¡ ¼0) f 0L ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)¼0f 0H
¤
dg0
+
R
v0o (1 ¡ ¹) (1 ¡ ¼1)¼0f 0Hdg0
¾
(B8)
Rearranging the posterior belief ¼1, we have ¼1 [¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL] = ¼0fH , which, after
di¤erentiating with respect to g0 gives (after rearranging)
f
0
L¼1 (1 ¡ ¼0) ¡ f 0H¼0 (1 ¡ ¼1) = ¡d¼1dg0 [¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL] (B9)
Inserting (B9) in (B8) yields,
¡ = (µH ¡ µL)
½ R
v0o (1 ¡ ¹)¼1 d¼1dg0 ¼0fHdg0 +
R
v0o (1 ¡ ¹)¼1 d¼1dg0 (1 ¡ ¼0) fLdg0¡ R v0o (1 ¡ ¹) (1 ¡ ¼1)¼0f 0Hdg0
¾
(B10)
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From the ¼1 expression, we have fL (1 ¡ ¼0)¼1 = fH¼0 (1 ¡ ¼1), so (B10) becomes
¡ = (µH ¡ µL)
½Z
v
0
o (1 ¡ ¹) d¼1dg0 ¼0fHdg0 ¡
Z
v
0
o (1 ¡ ¹) (1 ¡ ¼1)¼0f 0Hdg0
¾
(B11)
Now we integrate the second term in (B11) by parts. This yields,
(1 ¡ ¹)¼0
Z
v
0
o (1 ¡ ¼1) f 0Hdg0 = ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)¼0
Z
v
00
o (1 ¡ ¼1) d¼1dg0 fHdg0 (B12)
+(1 ¡ ¹)¼0
Z
v
0
o
d¼1
dg0
fHdg0
Inserting (B12) in (B11) gives (3.7). ¤
Derivation of Equation (3.15)
The derivation is similar to that of equation (3.7). First, note that Eg0 [w (¼1 (g0; a0))]
can be written
Eg0 [w (¼1 (g0; a0))] = (vc(¼0) ¡ vo(¼0))H (eg0; a0) + Z +1
~g0
(vo(¼1(g0; a0)) ¡ vo(¼0))h (g0; a0) dg0
= [c(a¤(¼0)) ¡R]H (eg0; a0) + Z +1
~g0
Á((¼1(g0; a0))h (g0; a0) dg0
where Á(¼1(g0; a0)) = vo(¼1(g0; a0)) ¡ vo(¼0); so Á(¼1(~g0; a¤0)) = 0; Á0 = v0o: So,
¡ ´ dEg0 [w
¤ (¼1 (g0; a0))]
da0
= (vc(¼0) ¡ vo(¼0))
µ
¡@H (eg0; a0)
@a0
¶
(B13)
+
Z +1
eg0 Á
0d¼1
da0
[¼0fH + (1 ¡ ¼0) fL] dg0
¡
Z +1
eg0 Á
h
¼0 (¹ + (1 ¡ ¹) µH) f
0
H + (1 ¡ ¼0) (¹+ (1 ¡ ¹) µL) f 0L
i
dg0
Integrating by parts the third term of (B13) and then rearranging with the …rst two terms
gives
¡ =
Z +1
eg0 Á
0
µ
d¼1
da0
+ (¹ + (1 ¡ ¹) µH) d¼1dg0
¶
¼0fHdg0 (B14)
+
Z +1
eg0 Á
0
µ
d¼1
da0
+ (¹+ (1 ¡ ¹) µL) d¼1dg0
¶
(1 ¡ ¼0) fLdg0
+ [R ¡ c(a¤(¼0))]
µ
¡@H (eg0; a0)
@a0
¶
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After using similar manipulations as for the derivation of equation (3.7), we obtain
¡ = (µH ¡ µL)
½Z +1
eg0 Á
0 (1 ¡ ¹) d¼1
dg0
¼0fHdg0 ¡
Z +1
eg0 Á
0 (1 ¡ ¹) (1 ¡ ¼1) ¼0f 0Hdg0
¾
+ [R¡ c(a¤(¼0))]
µ
¡@H (eg0; a0)
@a0
¶
(B15)
Now we integrate the second term in (B15) by parts. This yields,
(1 ¡ ¹)¼0
Z +1
eg0 Á
0 (1 ¡ ¼1) f 0Hdg0 = ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)¼0
Z +1
eg0
µ
Á00
d¼1
dg0
¶
(1 ¡ ¼1) fHdg0 (B16)
+(1 ¡ ¹)¼0
Z +1
eg0 Á
0d¼1
dg0
fHdg0
¡dÁ (¼1 (eg0; a0))
d¼1
(1 ¡ ¼1 (eg0; a0))¼0 (1 ¡ ¹) fH (eg0)
Inserting (B16) in (B15), and using Á0 = v00; and …nally evaluating at a0 = a¤0 (and
recalling ¼1 (eg0; a0) = ¼0) gives equation (3.15). ¤
C. The Normal-Quadratic Case
The example we use follows the speci…cation of Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999).
The cost of e¤ort function is quadratic (speci…cally c (a) = a2=2 + da; with d ¸ 0; so that
c0(0) ¸ 0), and the error term " is Normally distributed with mean zero and variance ¾2.
We now analyse the di¤erent sections of the model under our speci…c assumptions.
We can now prove that when the technology is additive (i.e. ¹ = 1), a unique equi-
librium arises. In the appointment case, this is immediate as in this case there is no
experimentation. For the democratic cases, when ¹ = 1, it is possible to calculate (details
on request) that
@Eg0 [w(¼1)]
@a0
¯¯¯¯
¹=1
=
"
R ¡ ± ¡ (a
¤ (¼0))2
2
¡ da¤ (¼0)
#
£
µ
¼0
¾
p
2¼
exp
·
¡ 1
8¾2
(µL ¡ µH))2
¸
+
(1 ¡ ¼0)
¾
p
2¼
exp
·
¡ 1
8¾2
(µH ¡ µL))2
¸¶
which is decreasing in a¤ (¼0). On the other hand, the marginal cost of e¤ort is upward
sloping. Hence a unique equilibrium exists. The simulations reported in the paper are
also based on this special case. Details are available on request.
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